Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 51

Issue 4

Article 8

1986

Keep Your Eye on the Birdie: Aircraft Engine Bird Ingestion
Robert Anthony Michael

Recommended Citation
Robert Anthony Michael, Keep Your Eye on the Birdie: Aircraft Engine Bird Ingestion, 51 J. AIR L. & COM.
1007 (1986)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol51/iss4/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For
more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

KEEP YOUR EYE ON THE BIRDIE: AIRCRAFT
ENGINE BIRD INGESTION
ROBERT ANTHONY MICHAEL

B IRDS ARE ONE of the most serious and persistent
natural threats to aircraft at airports throughout the
world.' Aviators have long recognized that flocks of birds
at or near airports are a safety hazard. 2 During the early
years of aviation, birds easily avoided the comparatively
slow flying aircraft. But the problem, generally referred
to as "bird strike," 4 has increased with the speeds of modern aircraft and is a particular hazard to turboprop and jet
aircraft. 5 Bird strikes, however, are not well publicized,
possibly due to the fact that there has not been a fatal air
carrier accident involving birds in the United States in
more than twenty years. 6 One expert stated: "Maybe people don't care because we haven't lost 7 an airliner full of
passengers to a bird strike in a while."
In the United States, more than 1,400 bird strikes occur
each year. 8 Bird strikes cause an estimated twenty million
Graham, Birdland: Confrontation In The Skies, AUDOBON, Jan. 1983, at 22.
10 N.T.S.B. ANN. REP. 15 (1976).
.1 Graham, supra note 1, at 22. However, a prominent transcontinental pilot
2

named Calbram "Cal" Perry Rodgers was killed at Long Beach, California, in
1912, when the carcass of a gull he had struck jammed the exposed control cables
of his biplane. Id.
4

Hingorani, Air Disasters, 9 AIR L. 100, 102 (1984). The problem is also called

"BASH" (Bird Aircraft Strike Hazard). Id. at 102.
- Graham, supra note 1, at 22. The increase in bird strikes is also due to the

large diameter ofjet engines. Id. Helicopters are also subject to bird strikes.
o Steenblik, Battling The Birds, AIRLINE PILOT, Jan. 1985, at 23.
7

Id.

Graham, supra note 1, at 22. This figure applies to civil aviation. Military
aircraft, which frequently fly high speed, low level missions, have a greater inci8
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dollars in damage annually to aircraft, together with the
possibility of injury or death to crew and passengers. 9
Birds may endanger the flight of a turboprop or jet aircraft, particularly at a crucial stage such as landing or
take-off, when birds are sucked into the turbine induction
system causing the engine to fail or malfunction."0
This article addresses the hazard posed to aircraft when
birds are ingested into aircraft engines."I The federal regulations that attempt to prevent bird ingestion through
powerplant design and construction, and the regulations
concerning bird hazard reduction at airports will be explored. 12 The article will also discuss the reported decisions involving aircraft crashes caused by bird ingestion,
focusing on the various theories of liability proposed by
dence of bird strikes. In 1983, over 2,300 strikes were reported by the Air Force
Bird/Aircraft Strike Hazard (BASH) Team, located at Tyndall Air Force Base,
Florida, which, since 1975, has been responsible for maintaining all Air Force
Bird/Aircraft strike data. Kull, 1983 Air Force Bird Strikes, in PROCEEDINGS, CONFERENCE, AND TRAINING WORKSHOP ON WILDLIFE HAZARDS TO AIRCRAFT,
(1984) [hereinafter cited as WILDLIFE HAZARDS].

at 49

9 Graham, supra note 1, at 22. The principal dangers of bird strikes are collisions with windshields (also referred to as cockpit intrusion or penetration), tail
structures, and engine ingestion. See Steenblik, supra note 6, at 18. While birds are
not generally viewed as dangerous objects, a four pound bird hitting an aircraft at
two hundred miles per hour impacts with a force of nine tons. Safety Corner, AOPA
PILOT, Nov. 1973, at 83.

lo 10 N.T.S.B. ANN. REP. 15 (1976). While cockpit intrusion can be fatal, engine ingestion is viewed as the more serious threat. The problem is described as
follows:
The engines of these planes have large intake openings which are
likely to ingest birds. The birds, when ingested, may damage one or
more of the rotating blades of an engine which, in turn, break off or
bend the other rotating blades in the engine. The result is that the
compressors in the engine become inoperative and the plane loses
its power.
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. City of New Haven, 574 F. Supp. 373, 375 (D. Conn.
1983).
"There is concern that the bird ingestion problem may become more serious as
new-generation turbofan-powered [commercial] aircraft with only two engines becomes [sic] operational in significant numbers over the next several years." Birds
v. Aircraft: No Winners, 39 ACCIDENT PREVENTION BULLETIN, FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION (Feb. 1982).
" While the focus of this article is aircraft engine bird ingestion, the theories
presented are applicable to incidents involving bird strike to other aircraft
strucures. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 18-31 and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs and the legal defenses available.13 Finally, possible methods and procedures for avoiding bird ingestion
and subsequent litigation will be suggested.' 4
I.

FEDERAL REGULATIONS

Federal regulations recognize the hazard that birds
pose to aircraft by requiring aircraft engines to continue
operation following bird ingestion.' 5 Since the possibility
of bird ingestion is most prevalent, and dangerous, at
take-off and landing, the regulations make it clear that the
most effective method for preventing bird ingestion is reducing the hazard at the airport.' 6 Limiting or preventing the presence of birds at airports lessens the likelihood
7
that birds will constitute a serious hazard to aircraft.'
Powerplant Regulations

A.

The ingestion of foreign matter, particularly birds, into
an aircraft engine is a recognized hazard which must be
considered in the design and construction of turboprop
or jet turbine engines.' 8 Prior to the issuance of an engine type certificate, the engine must comply with the regulations pertaining to foreign object ingestion.' 9 The
regulations require that the engine manufacturer design
and locate or protect the air induction system of the turof foreign matter
bine engine to minimize the ingestion
20
during take-off, landing, and taxiing.
The common kinds of foreign matter ingested into enIs See infra notes

32-171 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 189-196 and accompanying text.
is See infra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 25-31 and accompanying text. "80% of reported bird strikes
occur on or near airports - usually below 2,000 feet a.g.l." Horne, Safety Corner:
Feathers in the Fan, AOPA PILOT, June 1983, at 126.
17 "Scores of species have been involved in bird strikes, but a fiew types pose
most of the threat. According to the FAA, gulls (which come in 44 species worldwide) account for 40 to 43 percent of all strikes reported; migratory waterfowl
(primarily ducks and geese) about 11 percent." Steenblik, supra note 6, at 20.
i8 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 25.903(a)(2)(i,ii) (1985).
14 C.F.R. § 25.903(a)(2)(i,ii) (1985).
14 C.F.R. § 25.1091(d)(2) (1985).
14
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gines are ice, hail, water, and birds. 2 ' The regulations
require bird ingestion tests using three sizes of birds.22 A
turbine engine must withstand the ingestion of a four
pound bird without catching fire, bursting (releasing
hazardous fragments through the engine case), generating loads greater than ultimate loads, or losing the capability of being shut down.23 The engine must also be able
to withstand the ingestion of three ounce birds and one
and one-half pound birds without sustaining a twenty-five
percent power or thrust loss, requiring the shut down of
Sand and gravel were included in the foreign
21 14 C.F.R. § 33.77(e) (1985).
object ingestion regulations, but deleted when it was determined that sand and
gravel ingestion did not constitute a serious power loss threat. See 49 Fed. Reg.
6841 (1984).
22 14 C.F.R. § 33.77 (1985).
The manufacturer must test an engine under the
following ingestion conditions:
Foreign object

Test quantity

Speed of foreign

Engine operation

Ingestion

object

Birds
Three Ounce Bird

One for each 50 square
inches of inlet area or
fraction thereof up to a
maximum of 16 birds,
Three ounce bird
ingestion not required
if a one and one half
pound bird will pass
the inlet guide vanes
into the rotor blades.

Liftoff speed
of typical
aircraft

Takeoff

In rapid sequence
to simulate a
flock encounter
and aimed at
selected critical
areas.

One and One
Hall Pound Bird

One for the first 300
square inches of inlet
area, if it can enter the
inlet, plus one for each
additional 600 square
inches of inlet area or
fraction thereof tip to a
maximum of eight
birds.

Initial climb
speed of
typical aircraft,

Takeoff

In rapid sequence
to simulate a
flock encounter
and aimed at
selected critical
areas.

Four Poutd Size
Bird

One, if it can enter
the inlet

(I) Maximum
climb speed of
typical aircraft
if the engine
has inlet guide

(I) Maximum
cruise

(I) Aimed at
critical area

(2) Takeoff

(2) Aimed at
critical area

vanes

(2) liftiolf speed
of typical
aircrafi, if the
engine does
not have inlet
guide vanes.

Id.
To perform the bird ingestion test, a bird is fired from a special cannon into the
inlet of an engine operating at takeoff power. Horne, supra note 16, at 126.
23 14 C.F.R. § 33.77(a)(1-4) (1985).
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the engine within five minutes from the time of ingestion,
or resulting in a potentially hazardous condition.24
B.

Airport Regulations

The government began its airport certification program
in 1972.25 All airports serving any scheduled or unscheduled passenger operation of an air carrier conducted
with an aircraft having a seating capacity of more than
thirty passengers must have an airport operating certificate. 26 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will issue a certificate if, after investigation, the FAA finds that
the airport is properly and adequately equipped and able
to conduct a safe operation. 2 An applicant for an airport
operating certificate must establish instructions and procedures for the prevention or removal of factors at the airport that attract, or may attract, birds. 28 However, an
applicant need not establish these instructions and procedures if the FAA finds that a bird hazard does not exist
and is not likely to exist. 29 Furthermore, an applicant for
an airport operating certificate must show that it has appropriate procedures for identifying, assessing, and disseminating information to air carrier users of the airport
by "Notices to Airmen" (NOTAM) or other such means,
concerning conditions on and in the vicinity of the airport
that effect or may effect the safe operation of aircraft."
The procedures must cover the presence of a large
number of birds.A
24 Id. at § 33.77(b)(1-3).
Other aircraft structures must be able to withstand
collision with birds. See 14 C.F.R. § 25.631 (1985), which provides that the "empennage structure must be designed to assure capability of continued safe flight
and landing after impact with an 8 pound bird." Id.
25 See N.T.S.B. Rep. No. NTSB/SS-84/02 Safety Study Airport Certification & Operations 4 (1984).
2
27

14 C.F.R. § 139.3 (1985).
14 C.F.R. § 139.11(b) (1985).

' 14 C.F.R. § 139.67 (1985). This section is titled "Bird Hazard Reduction."
Id. Birds are attracted to airfields by open space, food, shelter, and water.
Solman, Birds and Aviation in WILDLIFE HAZARDS, supra note 8, at 1.
'1 14 C.F.R. § 139.67 (1985).
so Id. at § 139.69.
- Id. at § 139.69(b)(7).
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CASES

Bird ingestion litigation is a relatively new development
in aviation tort law.32 As a result, there are few reported
decisions discussing the feathery menace to aviation. 3
However, the existing body of bird ingestion case law may
be misleading due to recent developments which vitiate
prior theories of liability presented in the reported decisions.34 The modern decisions reflect a trend of placing
liability for bird ingestion on the airport operator and the
pilot.
A.

Early Decisions

1.

t"he "Boston Electra'"Litigation

The first major aircraft crash caused by bird ingestion
was the October 4, 1960 crash of a Lockheed Electra at
Boston's Logan International Airport. 5 The crash,
caused by engine ingestion of starlings and gulls, resulted
in over 150 actions for personal injury and wrongful
death against the airline, the aircraft and engine manufacturers, the United States, and the airport operator. 6 Rapp
v. Eastern Airlines discusses liability for the crash. While
the decision is less than satisfying in that it is written as
findings of fact and conclusions of law, Rapp is the seminal
See 1 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT LAW § 10:5, at 582 (1978).
33 In Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
931 (1967), bird strike was presented as a defense. The airline argued that a bird
strike momentarily distracted the crew making it impossible to execute a missed
approach. A dead bird was found near the crashsite but this was "hardly convincing proof that it was the cause of the accident" since the bird had been dead three
or four days before the crash. Id. at 232-33.
.4 See infra notes 174-182 and accompanying text.
• Hingorani, supra note 4, at 102.
3, Popkin v. Eastern Airlines, 253 F. Supp. 244, 245 (E.D. Penn. 1966). However, the "Boston Electra" crash is best known for the litigation concerning federal change of venue provisions. See, e.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612
(1964) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1948)).
.11264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Penn.), afld, 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 979 (1968), vacated by agreement and without opinion, 521 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir.
1970). Fifty-nine passengers and three crew died. There were only ten survivors.
Id. at 675.
32
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decision because it catalogues the theories of liability that
appeared in early bird ingestion cases.
The sole issue decided by the Rapp court concerned the
liability of the United States . 3 The plaintiffs raised four
theories of government liability for the crash. 3 9 First, the
plaintiffs claimed that the FAA issued a certificate of airworthiness for a plane that it knew or should have known
would ingest birds on take-off, resulting in the loss of
power at a critical period of the flight.40 Second, the
plaintiffs alleged that the FAA negligently issued a certificate of airworthiness for a plane that it knew or should
have known would ingest birds on take-off, with no limitations in the certificate against the use of that plane where
birds were likely to be encountered. 4' Third, it was alleged that the FAA acted negligently in failing to require
the airport operator to remove from the airport premises
ponds, weeds, and a garbage dump which the FAA knew
or should have known attracted birds. 42 Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the FAA negligently permitted the aircraft to take-off under conditions then existing at the
airport without some protection or inspection when they
knew or should have known that birds were a hazard and
could damage the aircraft.43 The Government answered
that there was no hazard, and even if there were, no reason existed to suspect that the accident would occur.44 In
response to the allegations of negligently certifying the
engine and aircraft, the Government argued that the regulations set minimum standards, and if these minimum
Rapp, 264 F. Supp. at 680-81.
-' Id. at 679.

-1

4o Id. Prior to certification, the FAA required engines to be subjected to the
chicken test. The chicken test consisted of injecting four pound chicken carcasses
into the engine to determine the effect of bird ingestion. The test conducted on
the Electra's engines indicated bird ingestion could cause internal damage resulting in power loss. Id. See supra note 22 and accompanying text for the present bird
ingestion test requirements.
4

Rapp, 264 F. Supp. at 679.

Id.
41 Id. The court based the FAA's knowledge on a 1949 study of bird strikes in
commercial aviation. Id. at 677.
42

44

Id. at 679.
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standards were met, the Government was justified in issuing the certificates.4 5
In determining the liability issue, the court applied general negligence principles.46 The district court held that
the FAA was negligent in issuing a type certificate for the
aircraft attesting to its airworthiness when the FAA knew
the engine was capable of ingesting birds on take-off and
that the resulting loss of power could pose a serious
threat to the aircraft.4 7 The district court also found that
the FAA negligently failed to require the airport operator
to remove the attractions to birds at the airport. 48 How-

ever, the opinion was subsequently vacated by agreement, 49 and is not considered to have precedential
value. 50 The opinion is nonetheless noteworthy in that,
up to 1984, it provided an argument for the imposition of
liability upon the United States for negligent
certification. 5 '
The "Executive Aviation" Litigation

2.

On July 28, 1968, a Falcon Mystere jet struck a flock of
gulls seconds after take-off from Burke Lakefront Airport
45

46

ld.

Id.
Id. at 680. The court stated:
We of course must place ourselves in the perspective of a jury in
deciding this case. Needless to say, we would advise them, that generally speaking and without detail, negligence is the doing of some
act which a reasonably prudent person would not do, or the failure
so to do; that ordinary care is such as a person would exercise in the
management of his own affairs to avoid injury to the person or property of others. We would also ask them to consider the reasonable
foreseeability of an event looking back to the negligent act if it existed, and whether they should have reasonably envisioned the
events which unfolded and caused the accident.

I7 Id. at 680.
48
49

Id. at 681.
See 521 F.2d 1379 (3d Cir. 1970).

50 Sellfors v. United States, 697 F.2d 1362 (11 th Cir. 1983). "Rapp was vacated
and has no precedential value. At the most, the Rapp holding would only be persuasive." Id. at 1366.
." See infra notes 172-182 and accompanying text.
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in Cleveland, Ohio.5 2 The plane suffered a substantial
loss of power, struck the airport perimeter fence, hit a
pick-up truck, and finally came to rest in Lake Erie.53
While
no one was injured, the soaked aircraft was a total
loss. 54 The named defendants were the municipal airport
operator, the airport manager, and the 55air traffic controller on duty at the time of the accident.
The complaint, filed in admiralty, alleged that the loss
of the aircraft resulted from the airport operator's negligence in clearing the aircraft for takeoff, in failing to warn
plaintiffs of the seagulls on the runway, and in failing to
remove the seagulls from the runway. 56 The court dismissed the action for lack of admiralty jurisdiction, be57
cause the alleged tort did not have a maritime locality.
The United States Supreme Court, in an unanimous opinion, held that federal admiralty jurisdiction does not extend to aviation tort claims arising from flights between
points within the continental United States.58 While the
issue of liability was not addressed, the district court opinion is noteworthy in its listing of possible theories and
defendants .
3.

The "Miree" Litigation

On February 26, 1973, a Lear jet crashed shortly after
take-off from the DeKalb-Peachtree Airport in Georgia.6"
The crash was caused by the ingestion of cowbirds that
were attracted to the airport area in large numbers by an
.52 Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 448 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.
1971), affd. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
5s 448 F.2d at 152.
54 Id.
Id.
Id.5
56

Id.

Id. at 154. The court stated: "[Tihe dispositive issue is whether the alleged
tort arose on land or on navigable water." Id. at 152. The court concluded the
alleged tort occurred on land. Id.
- 409 U.S. 249, 274 (1972). The suit was brought in admiralty to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. at 273 n.24.
57

.19See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.

- Miree v. United States, 526 F.2d 679, 681 (5th Cir. 1976).
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adjacent county garbage dump.6 All on board the aircraft died; the plane was destroyed, burning jet fuel falling from the disabled plane severely burned an individual
on the ground, and property at the crash site was extensively damaged. 62 The plaintiffs asserted theories of negligence and nuisance.63 The plaintiffs also sued for
breach of a contract entered into by the FAA and the
county under the Airport and Airway Development Act of
1970 (AADA). 64 The plaintiffs also argued that the
county's purchase of liability insurance waived the immunity defense. 65 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia deemed the county immune
from suit and dismissed the actions.66 The district court
-, Id. The Miree crash prompted the FAA to issue Order 5200.4 in 1974 to
attempt to deal with the hazard posed by garbage dumps located near airports.
See Harrison, FAA Policy Regarding Solid Waste Disposal Facilities in WILDLIFE
HAZARDS, supra note 8, at 213.
';'

-3

Miree, 529 F.2d at 681.
Id.

- Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat.
219, repealed, Pub. L. No. 97-748, tit. V, § 523(a), 96 Stat. 695 (1982)(codified at
49 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982)). The AADA provided in part that:
As a condition precedent to his approval of a project, the Administrator shall receive in writing, satisfactory to him that . . . [T]he aerial approaches to such airport will be adequately cleared and
protected by removing, marking, or lighting, or otherwise mitigating
exisiting airport hazards and by preventing the establishment or creation of future airport hazards.
49 U.S.C. § 1701(3). "Airport Hazard" was defined as:
[Any structure or object of natural growth located on or in the vicinity of a public airport, or any use of land near such airport, which
obstructs the airspace required for the flight of aircraft in landing or
taking off at such airport or is otherwise hazardous to such landing
and takeoff of aircraft.
Id. at § 1711 (1982). The Act was re-enacted and re-codified in 1982. See The
Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 671
(1982)(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 2201 (1986)).
6,5 Miree, 529 F.2d at 686.
See generally C. RHYNE, AIRPORTS AND THE LAW 59
(19 7 9)(listing cases where immunity was waived by procurement of liability
insurance).
, Miree, 529 F.2d at 679. County immunity was provided for by GA. CODE ANN.
§ 23-1502 (1971). "A county is not liable to suit for any cause of action unless
made so by statute." Id. Under the doctrine of "sovereign immunity," a government cannot be sued by one of its subjects unless it consents to the suit. The
doctrine is based upon the English maxim "the King can do no wrong." See W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, at 970 (4th ed. 1971).
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also found that under Georgia law, the purchase of liability insurance neither waives the immunity of the county
nor creates a direct cause of action against the insured.67
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
agreed that the county was immune from suit on theories
of negligence, nuisance, and insurance, but ruled that the
county could be liable on the theory that the plaintiffs
were third-party beneficiaries of the contract between the
FAA and the county, in which the county agreed to operate the airport safely.6 8 The Fifth Circuit, en banc,
granted rehearing and held that federal, not state law,
controlled in determining whether the plaintiffs were
third-party beneficiaries of the contract and ruled that
69
federal law barred the third-party beneficiary action.
The United States Supreme Court vacated the en banc
decision and held that state law applied rather than federal law. 7 ' The Court remanded the case for reconsideration under Georgia law. 7 1 The Court justified its decision
on the fact that only the rights of private litigants were at
issue and that no duties of the United States hinged on
the outcome of the litigation. 72 The Court did acknowledge the argument that such lawsuits could "be thought
to advance federal aviation policy by inducing compliance
with FAA safety provisions." 7 On remand, the Fifth Circuit certified questions for submission to the Supreme
Court of Georgia to determine whether the county was
immune from suit under the third-party beneficiary theory.74 The Georgia Supreme Court held that the action
could not be maintained against the county.7 5
67

Miree, 526 F.2d at 686.

68 Id.

69 Miree v. United States, 538 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1976).
70 Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 26 (1977).
71
72

Id. at 33.
Id. at 30-31.

7
Id. at 32. The Court did not find this argument convincing since 'the issue of
whether to displace state law on an issue such as this is primarily a decision for
Congress." Id.
74 Miree v. United States, 565 F.2d 1354, 1355 (5th Cir. 1978).
7- Miree v. United States, 242 Ga. 126, 249 S.E.2d 573, 578-80 (1978). The
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In subsequent Miree proceedings,76 the county airport
manager, a named defendant in the original litigation,
moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity because of his status as an official of the county. 7 7 The district court stated that the immunity issue would be
resolved by determining whether the airport manager's
actions were discretionary or ministerial acts. 78 The court
stated that a public official enjoys protection from liability
in the performance of his discretionary duties, but undertakes ministerial acts at his own risk.79 In reviewing the
airport manager's efforts to control the bird hazard problem, the court noted that the manager had the responsibility to abate or mitigate the hazard the birds posed. s
The court did not consider this responsibility to be a discretionary duty.8 ' The district court denied summary
judgment, finding that the manager could be held liable
for failing to take precautions possible at his level to end
82
the bird hazard.

court stated: "The mere fact that a member of the public would have benefited
from the performance does not create third party intended beneficiary status
under Georgia law." 249 S.E.2d at 580. The Miree decision was considered dispositive of the issues raised in the related case of Sellfors v. DeKalb County, 157
Ga. App. 731, 278 S.E.2d 489 (1981), even though Miree was an advisory opinion
not binding on the Georgia Court of Appeals. 278 S.E.2d at 490. Mr. Sellfors
piloted the ill-fated Lear jet that gave rise to the Miree litigation. Id.
7- Miree v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
77
78

Id. at 771.
Id. at 772-74.

The court stated:

A ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the execution of a specific duty. A discretionary act,
however, calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned
conclusions, and acting on them in a way not specifically directed.
This dichotomy is maintained, for the most part, by stressing the
nature of the act involved, the degree of responsibility entrusted to
the offical, and his position in his employer's hierarchy.
Id. at 774.
71,Id.

o

at 772-73.

Id. at 774-75.

8 Id.
82

Id. at 775 n. I.
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In Selifors v. United States,8 3 the plaintiff brought suit alleging government negligence for failure to enforce statutory obligations under the AADA. * The plaintiff also
alleged negligence on the part of the FAA air traffic controllers on duty at the time of the crash for failing to observe and warn of the presence of birds near the runway."
The trial court dismissed the action, finding no evidence
to indicate that the controllers had sighted any birds, and
found that the AADA would not support the plaintiffs
claim.8 6
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the deceased pilot was fully aware of the bird hazard at the airport.8" Additionally, the court noted that the aviation
flight charts (Jeppeson charts) in the deceased pilot's possession contained the bird hazard warning."8 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the finding that the air traffic
controllers were not negligent in failing to warn the pilot,
since no birds were sighted by the controllers prior to the
accident.89 The Eleventh Circuit considered the allegation that liability was created under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) for negligent failure of the FAA to enforce compliance of the airport operator's contractual assurances in the AADA. 90 The Government contended
83 697 F.2d 1363 (11 th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3571 (1984), discussed in
Dolley, Barber & Scott, Airport Law, 15 URB. LAw. 775, 782 (1983).
84 Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat.
219, repealed, Pub. L. No. 97-748, tit. V, § 523(a), 96 Stat. 695 (1982)(originally
codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982)). See supra note 64 for the pertinent part of the
Act.
5 Sellfors, 697 F.2d at 1364.
X6 Id.
' Id. The fatal crash occurred on Sellfors' second flight from the airport that
day. Id.
88 Id. The warning read: "Turbojet take otis between 5 p.m. and 30 minutes
after sunset prohibited. High density bird activity between 5 p.m. and 30 minutes
after sunset." Safety Corner, AOPA PILOT, Nov. 1973, at 82. The accident occurred
at 10 a.m. Id.
89 Id. at 1365.
- Id. at 1364. The FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) (1982), waives the sovereign
immunity of the United States for injuries caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of
his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a pri-
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that the FAA owed no duty of care to the pilot, and that, if
a duty existed, the acts or omissions complained of fell
within the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA. 91
The court reviewed the legislative history of the AADA
and found no congressional intent for the AADA to create
any duties owed by the the Government owed to private
individuals using sponsored airport facilities.92 The court
stated that the purpose of the AADA was to provide federal funds for developing and modernizing airports and
related facilities in conjunction with a national transportation policy, not to regulate the operation of airports.93
The legislative history showed no intent on the part of
Congress to impose a legal duty on the FAA, running to
each user of a federally funded airport, to insure the absolute safety of each facility constructed or maintained with
federal funds.94 The court held that the AADA does not
create a statutory duty in the federal government to protect private persons using federally-funded airports. 95
Similarly, the court found no basis for imposing liability on the Government under the "Good Samaritan" doctrine. 9 6 The court noted that interpretations of the
vate person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.
:) Sellfors, 697 F.2d at 1365.
92

Id. at 1366.

93 Id.

Id.
Id. at 1367.
96 Id. See generally Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955)(The
Coast Guard undertook operation of a lighthouse. Suit was brought by a boat
owner who had relied on the guidance of the lighthouse and wrecked while the
light was not working. The Court held that once operation had begun, the Coast
Guard had a duty to use due care to make certain that the light was kept in working order.) See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965) which provides that:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
service to another which he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to
the other for physical harm resulting from failure to exercise reasonable care to perform the undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm,
"-

or
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doctrine have uniformly held that where one does not create the dangerous condition and takes no remedial measures, one is not liable as a good samaritan.9 7 The court
concluded that the FTCA did not apply, and affirmed the
dismissal of the suit.98
4.

The "HawaiianAirlines" Litigation

In Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. United States,9 9 a Lockheed
Electra L-188 sustained damage on July 3, 1977, when
the aircraft ingested egrets into two engines while landing at Patrick Air Force Base in Florida. 00 The plaintiff
asserted that the Government was negligent in permitting
conditions to exist at Patrick that encouraged the nesting
of birds, in permitting birds to nest at or near the facility,
particularly the runways, and in failing to divert or delay
the landing of the aircraft until the birds had left the
area. 101
0 2
The plaintiff brought the suit under the FTCA.
Under Florida law, the airport operator has the duty "to
use proper care, precaution and diligence in providing
and maintaining the air field in a reasonably safe condition for the purposes to which it is adopted and is apparently designed to be used." 10 3 The court, recognizing that
"there is a problem at most every airport with birds,"
noted that Patrick has an Airfield Operations Branch
charged with the duty to implement the bird control
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance on the
undertaking.
Id.
Sellfors, 697 F.2d at 1368.
Id.
-' 16 Av. CAS. (CCH) 17,744 (M.D. Fla. May 7, 1981).

97

98

Id. at 17,745. The same type aircraft was involved in the "Boston Electra"
crash. See supra notes 35-51 and accompanying text.
0,
'2

HawaiianAirlines, 16 Av. CAS. (CCH) at 17,745.
See supra note 90 for the text of the FTCA.

1o, HawaiianAirlines, 16 Av. CAS. (CCH) at 17,745 (citing Peavy v. City of Miami,
1 So. 2d 614, 615 (Fla. 1941)). See generally 2 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, AVIATION
TORT LAW § 21:1, at 592-600 (1979)(discussing general principles of airport
liability).
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program. 0 4
The program in force at Patrick required airport personnel to report the observation of birds at the airfield.'0 5
A vehicle equipped with a radio and loudspeaker system
played tapes containing sounds of a dying sea gull and the
sound of a firing pistol. 10 6 A shotgun and a permit to kill
birds were obtained. 0 7 When birds were sighted or reported, employees drove the vehicle to the area, played
the tapes, and fired the gun to disperse the birds.' 0 8 The
airfield was inspected more than once each day. 10 9 "Notices to Airmen" (NOTAMs) were routinely issued to pilots stating: "Caution, birds can be expected in or near
the airfield." 0
The district court stated that the "defendant was required to exercise reasonable care to maintain and operate the airfield in a reasonably safe manner, to warn
aircraft of any known danger such as the existence of
birds on or near the runway, and to use proper precaution
and care to keep the runways free of any such birds."''
Reviewing the bird control program, the court found that
the government had used proper care and diligence in
12
The court acmaintaining and operating the airfield."
1 3
cordingly dismissed the complaint.'
- Hawaiian Airlines, 16 Av. CAS. (CCH) at 17,746.
105 Id.

1o6Id.
107 Id. An Airport Depredation Permit must be obtained from the Department
of the Interior, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, to shoot migratory birds which are
protected by federal law. See The Feather Curtain, FAA GENERAL AVIATION NEWS,
July-August 1984 at 10.
,o,Hawaiian Airlines, 16 Av. CAS. (CCH) at 17,746.

109 Id.

1 o Id. The court also stated that information concerning a bird hazard could be
communicated to incoming pilots by use of Air Traffic Information Services
(ATIS). Id. Pilots can be warned of birds in flight since large flocks of birds will
show up on radar. See Horne, snpra note 16, at 129.
11 Hawaiian Airlines, 16 Av. CAS. (CCH) at 17,746. There were approximately
one hundred thousand operations a year from Patrick and bird strikes were "very
minimal." Id.
112 Id. at 17,746-47.
I's Id.
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The Modern Trend

In Safeco Insurance Co. v. City of Watertown,' 14 a Saberliner
jet crashed at Watertown Municipal Airport, South Dakota, on June 14, 1975, after ingesting gulls into both engines. 115 The pilot, co-pilot, and one passenger were
injured; the aircraft was a total loss.' 6 The plaintiff's first
ground for recovery alleged that the FAA negligently certified the airport and subsequently failed to enforce its
airport certification regulations.' 17
The plaintiff brought suit under the FTCA, contending
that the airport certification regulations imposed a duty
on the Government." 8 However, the court stated that a
regulation which does not purport to establish civil liability, but merely makes provision to secure the safety or
welfare of the public as an entity, is not subject to a civil
liability construction." 9 The court did suggest that liability could be imposed on the Government under factual
circumstances falling within the good samaritan doctrine.1 20 The court stated that the defendant "in some
positive way must have contributed to the injury, either by
increasing risk of harm, . . . by interposing himself between another person and the duty that the other person
owed to someone else, ..
or by inducing reliance on his
1 21
undertaking."
In applying the doctrine to the facts in Safeco, the court
found the crucial inquiry to be whether the Government's
inspection of the airport created a duty under South Da114 529 F. Supp. 1220 (D.S.D. 1981) (discussed in Dolley, Barker & Kinner, Airport Law 15 URB. LAw. 775, 781-82 (1981)).
"'5 Safeco, 529 F. Supp. at 1222.
I16

Id.

Id. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text for the airport regulations
found in 14 C.F.R. §§ 139.1-139.127 (1985).
118 Safeco, 529 F. Supp. at 1223. See supra note 90 for the applicable provision of
the FTCA.
119 Id.
,20 Id. at 1224. See supra note 96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
good samaritan doctrine.
121 Safeco, 529 F. Supp. at 1224.
",
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kota law.' 22 The district court found that the plaintiff
failed to prove the elements of the good samaritan doctrine since the plaintiff could not prove that the FAA's
certification and inspection program increased the risk of
bird strikes at. certificated airports. 23 The court stated
that pilots generally rely on the airport operator, rather
than the Government, to ensure that an airport is free of
hazards. 24 The court rejected the theory that the airport
the Governcertification regulations imposed any duty 1on
25
ment that would give rise to a tort action.
The plaintiff also alleged negligence on the part of the
airport operator. 26 The court stated the elements of a
negligence action to be: "That there be a duty owed by
the defendant to the plaintiff, that there was a breach of
this duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injury."'' 27 The court had no difficulty in
finding that the airport operator had a duty, independent
of federal regulations, to the pilots using the airport to
hazards
use reasonable care to keep the airport free from
28
pilots.
the
to
known
or to warn of hazards not
The controlling issue was whether a bird problem existed at the airport which required the issuing of warnings. 129 The court considered the testimony of
ornithologists as to what attracted the birds to the airId. at 1225.
Id. at 1224-25.
'24 Id. at 1225. The court noted that the FAA's airport certification program had
been in operation only since 1973. Id.
12,5 Id.
120 Id.
122
1'-

,27 Id. at 1225-26.
""

Id. at 1226. The court cites the following:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his
business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public
while they are upon the land for such purpose, for physical harm
caused by the accidental . . . harmful acts of

. .

. animals, and by

the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm,
or otherwise protect them against it.
Id. at 1226 n.6 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965)).
1219Safeco, 529 F. Supp. at 1226.
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field. 30 The court also discussed the physical attributes
and habits of the birds, finding that gulls pose a particular
danger to aircraft because, when frightened, the gulls take
off in a mass, 3 moving straight up with their long wings
outstretched.' 1
The court, acknowledging the difficulty in completely
eliminating a bird problem, found the airport operator
could have utilized a NOTAM to inform pilots about the
bird hazard. 32 Failure to issue the NOTAM was the controlling factor in the court's imposition of liability on the
airport operator.1 1 3 The court found that since the regulations require airport operators to issue NOTAMs, the
failure to issue a NOTAM is "additional proof of the [airport operator's] negligence."' 3 4 The court held that the
proximate cause of the crash was the failure to warn the
pilot of the presence of birds. 35 The court did not find
any negligence on the part of the Flight Service Station
(FSS) personnel on duty at the airport. 36 It based this
finding on the fact that airport inspection is not a duty of
the FSS personnel, but the duty of the airport
37
management.
,soId. at 1227.

is,Id. The ornithologist testified that birds are particularly drawn to runways
during wet weather since rain forces worms out of their holes onto the runway and
the runway also provides firm footing for the birds. Id. at 1227.
132 Id. at 1228. "Virtually nothing...
would guarantee that gulls would not be
present." Id.
153 Id.
134 Id. The regulation requiring the issuance of a NOTAM for birds is 14 C.F.R.
§ 139.69 (1985). See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
135Safeco, 529 F. Supp. at 1229.
156 Id.
137 Id. at 1229-30. The court stated: "Federal regulations in 14 C.F.R. Part
139
indicate that it appears to be the airportoperator's duty to identify safety problems
on the airport and to disseminate this information by NOTAMs." Id. at 1230. See
also 14 C.F.R. § 139.91 (1985) which provides that:
(a) The operator of each certificated airport shall continually review
its self inspection program to insure that prompt and accurate corrective action is taken to eliminate unsafe conditions on the airport.
(b) The operator shall(1) Conduct a safety inspection of the airport at least once each day,
except as otherwise authorized in its approved airport operations
manual; and
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Furthermore, the district court did not find any negligence on the part of the pilot for his failure to see the
birds on the runway prior to takeoff.' 38 The court, acknowledging that the "pilot in command of an aircraft is
directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the
operation of that aircraft,' ' 1 39 found that the pilot and copilot followed normal operating procedures, took reasonable precautions, and most importantly, checked for any
NOTAMs issued for the airport. 14 0 The court found that
or heedlessly proceed into a
the pilot did not blindly
"zone of danger."" ' Judgment for the full value of the
destroyed 42 aircraft was entered against the airport
operator. 1
In Insurance Co. of North America v. City of New Haven, 143 a
Cessna Citation crashed at the Tweed-New Haven Airport, Connecticut, on October 16, 1975, after ingesting
gulls on takeoff.' 44 The district court noted that "during
the mid-1960's, it became increasingly apparent to those
involved in aviation that birds were a serious hazard to air
traffic."' 145 Birds were a known hazard at the airport. 146 In
determining whether the operator acted negligently, the
court applied traditional negligence principles: the plaintiff had to establish that the airport operator owed them a
duty of due care, that this duty was breached, and4 7that the
breach of the duty proximately caused the lOSS.'
The court found that an airport operator has "the duty
of exercising reasonable care and control to protect its invitees from dangers which might reasonably be antici(2) Conduct an additional safety inspection whenever required by
the circumstances ....

Id.

140
141
14'
143
144

145

Safeco, 529 F. Supp. at 1230.
Id. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(a) (1985).
Safeco, 529 F. Supp. at 1231.
Id. at 1234.

Id.
574 F. Supp. 373 (D. Conn. 1983).
Id. at 374.
Id. at 375.

14;

Id.

1.7

Id. at 376-77.
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pated to arise from the condition of the premises or the
activities taking place there." 1 48 Since birds were a known
hazard at the airport, it was evident that the airport operator owed a duty to pilots using the airport to exercise reasonable care to remedy the existing bird hazard,
or at
49
least to warn unsuspecting pilots of the peril.'
The court reviewed the measures taken by the airport
operator to reduce the bird hazard. 50 The court found
no evidence showing that the airport operator maintained
any bird attractions. 15 To scare birds from the airfield,
the airport operator drove an automobile at the flocks
while sounding the horn. 52 The plaintiff contended that
the operator should have used alternative scare devices,
namely a recorded gull's distress call coupled with the use
of a shotgun 53firing shellcrackers and, on occasion, live
ammunition.
The court disagreed with the plaintiffs contention,
finding that at the time of the accident, the car horn was a
reasonable scare device. 5 4 However, the court did note
that the NOTAM "is and was" the generally accepted
method of advising pilots of a bird hazard. 55 The airport
operator had failed to issue a NOTAM and, consequently,
the court 56
found the failure to do so constituted
1
negligence.
Although the airport operator was negligent in failing
to issue a NOTAM, the court found that the proximate
-4Id. at 377.
Id.
150 Id. at 377-79.
15,Id. at 377-78.
140

152

153
154

Id. at 378.
Id.

Id.

,-.Id. at 379. "It is reasonable to assume that pilots, if on notice that there were

bird concentrations at an airport, in the exercise of due care, would take cautionary measures to avoid possible bird strikes." Id. NOTAMs are available to pilots
at Flight Service Stations and are printed in the Airmen's Information Manual. Id.
at 378-79.
,-oId. at 379. "In the court's opinion, prudent care required the issuance of a
NOTAM concerning the bird aircraft hazard . .

tuted negligence." Id.

.

. The failure to do so consti-
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cause of the crash was the failure of the co-pilot to inform
t5 7
the pilot of his sighting of birds prior to the takeoff roll.
The court found that the pilot was familiar with the airport and that if he had been informed by his co-pilot of
the presence of birds, he would have taken actions to minimize the possibility of bird ingestion. 158 The court found
no negligence on the part of the air traffic controllers at
the airport, since it was not their responsibility
to perform
59
physical inspection of the runway areas.'
The decision in New Haven, like prior bird ingestion
cases, is a product of extensive data gathering and intensive analysis of the bird problem at the airport, including
the testimony of a bird expert. The decision also notes
the factor of the pilot's responsibility and negligence
which can be presented as a defense by the airport operator.' 60 However, it would not be advisable to place great
reliance on the court's approval of the car horn as the sole
scare device.16 ' The general consensus is that a variety of
scare devices and tactics must be used, and varied, so the
162
birds do not get used to them.
Overseas National Airways v. United States' 6 1 represents the
most recent bird ingestion case. The action arose out of
the crash and explosion of a DC-10 aircraft at New York's
John F. Kennedy International Airport on November 12,
1975.164 The aircraft struck a flock of seagulls during
takeoff causing one of the engines to catch fire.t 65 No one
was injured but the aircraft was destroyed. 166 The case
highlights the possible disastrous consequences of bird
ingestion involving a widebody passengerjet. There were
no serious injuries since all one hundred and thirty-nine
Id.
.- Id. at 380.

157

139

Id.

'

Id.

See supra notes 152-154 and accompanying text.
See Graham, supra note 1, at 24.
'6. 766 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1985).

Id. at 98.
Id.
,,' Id. at 99.
-4

65

1986]

COMMENT

1029

passengers were airline employees 67who had prior emergency aircraft evacuation training. 1
The plaintiff brought suit in federal court under the
FTCA claiming that the FAA acted negligently in certifying the aircraft's engines, in certifying the airport, and in
clearing the plane for takeoff. 168 The United States initiated a third party action against the airport operator
claiming that the city negligently operated a garbage
dump close to the airport that attracted the birds.' 69
While the decision does not directly address the issue of
the imposition of liability, the crash itself is noteworthy in
that it prompted the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) to make recommendations for a more effective bird control system at JFK and nearby LaGuardia
and Newark International, as well as changes in the design
of the engine to make it more "birdproof."'' 7 0 The aircraft accident report states: "The complexity of controlling bird populations on or around airports requires
ecological and ornithological studies before an effective
program can be formulated."' 7' The statement highlights
the need for preventive measures rather than mere dispersal of birds on an airport.
C.

Varig

A majority of the reported bird ingestion decisons have
alleged negligence on the part of the Government in certiGraham, supra note 1, at 24.
- Overseas, 766 F.2d at 99.
-6,
Id. The United States and the airport operator sought contribution and indemnification from the municipal garbage dump operator. Id.
170 See N.T.S.B. Rep. No. NTSB-AAR-76-19, Aircraft Accident Report, Overseas National Airways, Inc., Douglas DC-10-30, N1032F, John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York, November 12, 1975 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as NTSB Report]. The recommendations included requiring a physical inspection of runways prior to designation as active and recommending the elimination of a nearby garbage dump. Id. at 25.
'7'
NTSB Report, supra note 170, at 21. The report further states: "An airport
certification inspector, who is aeronautically orientated, can determine that birds
represent a serious problem at an airport, but he cannot evaluate the technical
aspects of the problem to determine which bird reduction program will be effective." Id.
167
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fying aircraft and airports. Although, with the exception
of Rapp, 172 the Government escaped liability, it appeared
that there was a possibility of liability for negligent certification. 173 In 1984 that possibility was put to rest. The
United States Supreme Court in United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines)17' held
that the Government was not liable for negligence in certifying aircraft for use in commercial aviation. 7 5 The
Government was sued under the FTCA for negligently
certifying an aircraft which did not comply with FAA standards. 1 76 The Court held that these actions were barred
177
by the discretionary function exception of the FTCA.
The opinion can be summed up by the following language: "[Tlhe FAA has a statutory duty to promote safety in
air transportation, not to insure it.' 7 The decision, as
one commentator states, "safeguards the certification
process of the FAA in its entirety."' 179 The net effect in a
bird ingestion case is that, unless the good samaritan doctrine can be invoked, the Government is no longer a viable defendant. 8 0 Vang would seem to preclude suit for
8
negligent certification of aircraft, engines, and airports.'
The regulations merely set the minimum standards and
place the full burden of compliance on the manufacturer,
8 2
carrier, or airport operator.
172

For a discussion of Rapp, see supra notes 35-51 and accompanying text.

,73 See Comment, It's A Bird, It's A Plane, It's The FAA: Government Liability For
Negligent Airworthiness Certification, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 247 (1979).
,74 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984).
75

Id. at 2769.

For a discussion of Varig, see Note, Federal Tort Claims Act - U.S. Not Liable
For Negligence In Certifying Aircraft For Use In Commercial Aviation, 10 AIR L. 106
(1985). See also Comment, United States v. Varig Airlines: The Supreme Court Narrows
The Scope of Government Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 51 J. AIR L. & COM.
176

197 (1985).
177 Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2755.
178 Id.
7,9 See Note, supra note 176, at 108.
6) Id. For a discussion of the good samaritan doctrine see supra note 96 and
accompanying text.
"'" See Note, supra note 176, at 108.
182Id.
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STRATEGIES

The reported decisions, when read in the light of Vang,
establish the various limitations on the theories of liability
and defense in bird ingestion cases. The cases also
demonstrate that bird ingestion litigation is a sophisticated, complex, and factually dependent undertaking.
From the plaintiffs perspective, it is elementary that the
airport operator, and possibly the airport manager individually, should be named as defendants. However, if the
airport operator is a governmental entity, it may be immune from suit. If immunity is determined not to exist or
if immunity is waived by the presence of liability insurance, the plaintiff may proceed under a two-prong negligence attack. The first prong is under general negligence
principles. The second is alleging specific violations of
airport regulations, if the airport is certificated.1 83 The
most successful litigation strategy is proving that a bird
hazard was known to exist and the airport operator failed
to warn those using the airport of the hazard by use of a
NOTAM.
If the factual circumstances merit, a suit against the
United States might be maintained under the good samaritan doctrine. 84 To date, the carrier has escaped liability
as a defendant. 8 5 Liability could be predicated on the
carrier's disregard of the presence of birds, or warnings of
the presence of birds, at or near the airport. Likewise, the
engine manufacturer has escaped liability. A suit might
be maintained if the facts demonstrate a disregard for the
86
engine regulations.

For counsel representing an airport operator defendant, it is paramount to establish that a bird hazard did not
exist, or if one did exist, that the airport operator had
done all that could reasonably be expected to control the
hazard. The most effective defense is to show compliance
See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
,85 2 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT LAW § 10:5 at 583 (1979).
116See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
"'s

184
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with the airport regulations, especially the issuing of
NOTAMs. A second effective defense is to prove that the
pilot's failure to take notice of the bird hazard was the
proximate cause of the crash. The pilot's negligence may
also be used to mitigate the amount of damages, particularly if the pilot was familiar with the airport or had knowledge of the hazard. Pilots can assist in the reduction of
bird hazards by first, becoming aware of the frequency
and danger of a bird strike; second, reporting the presence of birds to the airport operator; and third, filing a
Bird Strike/Incident Report with the FAA if a strike
87
occurs. 1
The reported decisions establish the need for exhaustive investigation and documentation. It is essential to
obtain an ornithologist to assist in evaluating the bird
population at the airport. In sum, the burden falls on the
airport operator to prevent or remedy the presence of
8
birds at or near the airport.1
IV.

CONCLUSION

Birds constitute a definite aviation hazard. The cases
and literature discussing the problem of bird control suggest that there is no way to completely solve the problem
birds may create at airports other than wholesale slaughter of the birds upon arrival. This "scorched earth" policy is a choice of last resort. If a bird hazard does not
exist, the airport operator should make sure that condi181See Steenblik, supra note 6, at 22. The Bird Strike/Incident Report is FAA
Form 5200-7. The "standard advice" given to pilots in the event they should
encounter a flock of birds in flight is to to climb, since birds in flight usually descend when frightened. When flying in the vicinity of birds, it is recommended to
reduce airspeed below cruise where feasible, to give the birds a chance to avoid
the aircraft. Reducing speed also reduces the force of impact should a collision
occur. The use of the external aircraft lights, particularly strobe lights, has been
recommended to make the aircraft more conspicuous to birds. See The Feather
Curtain, FAA GENERAL AVIATION NEWS, July - Aug. 1984 at 9.
1"" "Millions of dollars may depend upon early recognition of the potential liabilities of airport facility operators for an aircraft accident." Foreman, Liabilities of
Operators of Airport Facilities ForAircraft Accidents, 3 FORUM 5 (1967). See also Campbell, Legal Responsibilities of Small Aiport Owners - A Growing Problem, 35 INS. COUNS.
J. 253 (1968).
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tions do not develop which might attract birds. If a bird
problem exists, a system of bird detection and control
must be employed. Bird control takes two forms: short
term dispersal techniques and long term preventive measures. Both are necessary for the implementation of an effective bird control program. 189
A system of airport bird control should include regular
logged runway patrols. Inactive runways should be inspected prior to activation. Patrols should utilize vehicles
which can be used to scare birds and to insure that bird
control personnel can proceed quickly to the birds' location. Any natural or man-made bird attractions which
provide food sources or roosting areas should be removed. t90 Species specific distress calls played over loudspeakers mounted on the airfield or on the bird control
vehicles, the use of shellcrackers, carbide cannons, and
even live ammunition should be used to disperse the
birds.' 9 1 Falconry has been used at some airports with
success. 192 Some airports display dead birds or model
predatory birds as scare devices. 193 Also, chemicals may
be applied to the area or tainted food could be used to
repel the birds. Ornithologists should be consulted to devise methods to reduce or remove bird populations.
According to the current law, at least one measure is
imperative: A warning must be issued to those who use
the airport.' 94 While the above methods will not com189 For an excellent collection of international materials on bird hazard see
WILDLIFE HAZARDS, supra note 8, which contains 38 papers, the majority dealing

with bird hazard reduction. The report, D.O.T. Rep. No. DOT/FAA/AAS/84-1,
is available from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia
22161. See also Hughes, Air Traffic Control And Airport Authorities point, 9 AIR L. 202, 210-211 (1984).
- See Horne, supra note 16, at 128.
19, See Steenblik, supra note 6, at 21.
92 See Home, supra note 16, at 128.
"'
Id.

The U.K. View-

"
See supra notes 114-159 for a discussion of cases where the airport operator
was found to be negligent for failing to issue a NOTAM. See also 50 Fed. Reg.
43,114 (1985) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 139) (proposed Oct. 25, 1985)
which provides:
(a) Each certificate holder shall provide at least one of the following
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pletely insulate an airport operator from liability, they do
represent currently accepted methods of dealing with a
possibly devastating natural hazard.' 95 Based on the reported decisions, the airport operator is generally the
means for disseminating to pilots who may wish to use the airport
information concerning conditions on, and in the vicinity of, the airports that affect, or may affect, the safe operation of aircraft:
(1) The Notices to Airmen System.
(2) Any other means acceptable to the Administrator.
(b) Each certificate holder shall report the following conditions:
(7) The presense of a bird hazard or potential bird hazard.
Id.
195See also 50 Fed. Reg. 43,113-114 (1985) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 139)
(proposed Oct. 25, 1985) which provides:
(a) Each certificate holder shall indicate to the Administrator
whether or not a bird hazard exists on the airport. If a hazard exists,
an ecological study shall be conducted by a qualified biologist. The
study shall (1) Identify the species, numbers, locations, local movements and
daily and seasonal occurrence of birds observed in the airport area;
and the species that have been or are likely to be involved in
bird/aircraft strikes;
(2) Identify and locate features on and near the airport that attract
birds, such as garbage disposal and water areas: and
(3) Assess the potential hazard from various bird species within
the airport area.
(b) The results of the ecological study shall be the basis for the
development by the certificate holder, with technical assistance from
the Administrator, of an airport bird management plan. The plan
shall provide measures to alleviate bird hazards at the airport and
shall include the following:
(1) To the extent practicable, priorities for needed habitat modification and changes in land use, with target dates for completion.
(2) Procedures for:
(i) The operation of bird patrols, and for coping with daily and
seasonal high hazard periods.
(ii) Communications between air traffic control towers, pilots, and
airport bird-management personnel.
(iii) Evaluation and review of the bird management plan.
(3) Personnel and equipment needs.
(4) Training programs.
(c) When a bird hazard exists, the certificate holder shall show
that it has the capability and equipment for dispersing potentially
hazardous birds. When such occasions arise, the certificate holder
shall comply with the following:
(1) For an airport with an operating air traffic control tower, conduct physical inspections of a runway and adjacent areas prior to
that runway being designated the active runway or prior to aircraft
operations on other than the active runway. Bird dispersal proce-
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party who bears liability for the birds.' 9 6
There is no way to eliminate the possibility of bird

strike or ingestion. But, the hazard may be reduced and
controlled by land modification, scare devices, and by alerting those using the airport of the presence of birds by
the use of Notices to Airmen (NOTAM). The long term

solution is to determine what specific species constitute
the bird hazard and then develop a system of habitat manipulation tailored to that species. Man and bird have and

will continue to share the skies, save an occasional run in.
In the interim, the best advice to those who must share
airspace with our feathered friends is "keep your eye on
the birdie."

dures shall be carried out as often as necessary to minimize the hazard.
(2) For airport with no operating air traffic control tower, inspect
runways and adjacent areas as required by local conditions, and
carry out bird dispersal procedures as often as necessary to minimize
the hazard.
Id.

The FAA states: "It is not anticipated that the proposal would require any airport
to change or expand its bird management program." Id. at 43,103. However,
when compared with the present regulation, 14 C.F.R. § 139.67 (1985) (discussed
supra at notes 26-31), the proposal arguably places a heavier burden on the airport
operator.
11.,;See also Note, A./S. Fred Olsens Flyselkskap v. Norwich City Council and Norfolk

County Council. 5 AIR L. 35 (1980)(discussing an unreported English decision imposing liability on the airport operator for a bird ingestion accident); du Perron,

Liability of the Air Traffic Control Agencies and Airport Operators in Civil Law Jurisdictions,

10 AIR L. 203, 213-14 (1985)(discussing an unreported Dutch bird ingestion case
imposing liability on the airport operator).

